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ARTICLES
PENNSYLVANIA ESCHEAT LAWS: PROPOSALS
FOR REVISION
By ROBERT B. ELY, III *
INTRODUCTION
T THE last regular session of the General Assembly, House Bill 1417 was
introduced, and, as stated in its title, the purpose of the bill was "to
consolidate, amend and revise the escheat laws of the Commonwealth, pro-
viding for the taking of property and money by the Commonwealth as escheat
and as custodian...." This bill did not pass. "Because of the complexity
of the situation and the lack of time," it was referred by House Resolution 119
to the Pennsylvania Joint State Government Commission "to make a study of
the laws ... and to make a report of its findings to the General Assembly as
soon as possible, but no later than the next session, together with appropriate
legislation to carry its findings into effect."
This article reviews the existing law and suggests how the Joint State
Government Commission might implement sound principles not fully em-
bodied in present statutes. These principles were jointly endorsed by insur-
ance, financial, utility, manufacturing and other corporate interests appearing
before the House Judiciary Committee when H. B. 1417 was under consid-
eration, and they are as follows:
(1) In exercising its power of escheat, the Commonwealth should not
overreach to persons or property beyond its proper control;
(2) Holders of allegedly escheatable property should not be subjected to
multiple, conflicting claims by the Commonwealth and by other sov-
ereigns or parties;
(3) No statute or decision as to escheat or custodial taking should be
retroactive;
(4) Holders of allegedly escheatable property should have the same de-
fenses against the Commonwealth as against the private claimants
to which the Commonwealth succeeds; and
• B.S. Princeton University 1928; LL.B. University of Pennsylvania, 1931; member Pennsyl-
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(5) The effort and expense of reporting, payment and collection of es-
cheatable property, should not be unreasonable as compared to the
worth of that property.
The procedures for escheat and custodial taking have become a big busi-
ness for the Commonwealth in recent years. As a result, a thankless and ex-
pensive burden has been placed upon corporations doing business in Penn-
sylvania. In 1958 the Secretary of Revenue was quoted as saying that collec-
tions from escheats in recent years had been 743,577 dollars in 1955, 1,006,263
dollars in 1956 and 1,276,294 dollars in 1957.' The source of this revenue
was said to be "banks, insurance companies, railroads, utilities and other cor-
porations," as well as mutual savings fund societies and finance companies.
H. B. 1417 was drafted broadly enough to extend the source to religious, edu-
cational, fraternal and charitable organizations.
The Secretary also stated that "if the $4,000,000 goal [were] reached
during the fiscal year ending May 31, 1959, it [would] represent four times
the usual yearly amount." 2 His prophesy was that "money from the escheat
program will be a significant and welcome addition to the State Treasury an-
nually." a His optimism is borne out by figures for other States, quoted in
"The Business Lawyer" for July 1959.:
The operation of the escheat program was exemplified as early as 1935
when one person "filed with the Department of Revenue . . . [a] document
which purported to be informations in escheat [naming] one hundred fifty-
eight railroad, public utility and industrial corporations." Almost twenty-
five years later, one of these corporations finally settled its litigation for about
500,000 dollars.' Recently, the Secretary of Revenue referred in an interview
to "dividends received [by finance companies] on life insurance purchased by
borrowers to secure loans . . . generally amount[ing] to less than 10c . . . and
not distribute[d] because the cost of issuing and mailing checks would have
been prohibitive." (Emphasis added.) It was announced that "one finance
company expects to pay the Commonwealth $125,000" of such dividends.'
Even as this is being written, the present Attorney General has announced that
she is conducting a special audit of the official accounts of the Prothonotary's
' Philadelphia Inquirer, August 17, 1958.
2 Ibid.
a Ibid.
4 McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and The Corporation Lawyer, 14 Bus. LAW.
1062 (1959).5 Supra note 1.
6Edelman v. Boardman, 332 Pa. 85, 2 A.2d 393 (1938). See also Murdoch v. Penna. R.R.,
19 Pa. D. & C. 2d 573, 73 Dauph. 65 (1958).
7 Supra note 1.
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Office of Montgomery County, seeking to escheat "close to $50,000." 1 Al-
though the importance of this source of revenue can be readily seen, the gen-
eral area is not well understood.
Recently, the Governor has been quoted in a news release as saying that
"since the word 'escheat' is too often imbued with the connotation of devious
conduct, the proposed Act (later appearing as H. B. 1417) would refer to
all actions under it as 'actions for custodial taking'." ' Actually, the word is
from the French eschoir, "to happen," and need not have the sinister signifi-
cance which the public may give it. At early common law this "happening"
was "a failure of issue in those who hold of the king, when there does not
exist any heir by consanguinity," 1o so as to cause reverter to the royal ex-
chequer. This was also the theory of Pennsylvania's Act of 1787, which pro-
vided for the escheat of "real or personal estate within this Commonwealth
[whenever] any person . . . has died or shall die intestate without heirs or
known kindred, a widow or surviving husband." " (Emphasis added.)
This changed the common law since escheat originally occurred only as to
real property; while personal property without known owner was called bona
vacantia, and was taken by the crown under a different jus regale. The under-
lying motive in both cases, in addition to being a source of revenue, was to
preserve the peace by interposing royal authority to prevent disputes among
first-comers.
A third way in which the sovereign acquired ownerless and unpossessed
tangible property was through "treasure trove" (from the French trouver, "to
find"). This name was given to "money or coin, gold, silver, plate or bullion
which, having been hidden or concealed in the earth or other private place
so long that its owner is unknown, has been discovered by accident." 12 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a case dealing with escheat of $92,000
found in a box, "purposely refrain[ed] ... from considering whether the law
of treasure trove is or ever has been a part of the law of Pennsylvania." 13
The three essentials of escheat, bona vacantia and treasure trove are that
the property in question has no known owner, no known possessor, and is
tangible. By taking the property, the sovereign harms no known person, and
removes temptation of a possible dispute.
8 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, April 7, 1960.
9 Philadelphia Inquirer, April 4, 1959.
10 COKE ON LITTLETON, 13.
11 2 Sm. L. 425, sec. 2.
12 1 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 295.
13 Appeal of Rogers, 361 Pa. 51, 62 A.2d 900 (1949); later phase of same litigation: 369 Pa.
371, 86 A.2d 55 (1951').
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On the other hand, in "custodial takings," there are different facts and
different motives. Statutes for custodial taking cover all types of tangible and
intangible personal property, such as "choses in action, claims, debts, demands
. . . and every other form of personal property, tangible or intangible, and all
interests therein, whether legal or equitable." ", In the case of such obligations
there is no unpossessed property which would tend to cause a dispute. More-
over, there is no way to take this property, except by compelling the obligor to
part with its money's worth out of his own pocket.
In contrast with true escheat and tangible bona vacantia, there is no true
"holder" of such intangible property. Again in contrast with the circum-
stances of ownerless tangible property, a custodial taking must be from the
so-called "holder." Finally, in a custodial taking, that "holder" suffers detri-
ment by being compelled to make recompense which is imposed on no one in
the case of ownerless property. The sovereign, having harmed no one in
taking ownerless property, need not justify the taking. In the cust6dial taking
of unclaimed or abandoned property in the hands of a holder, the sovereign
does harm that holder in a real, if not a legal sense by the compulsory transfer
of possession. Additional harm is done to the true "owner" (obligee) if the
State's possession is changed to title by later escheat, and if no provision for
refund is made.
Escheat, bona vacantia, and custodial taking, like taxation and eminent
domain, are methods of getting private property into the public treasury.
While this similarity exists, there is yet a stronger difference between escheat
or custodial taking on the one hand and taxation and eminent domain on the
other. In the case of escheat or custodial taking the State makes no payment
nor does it offer any other quid for the quo of taking. However in case of
taxation the citizen is compensated in the form of public services, such as
police protection and sanitation. Under eminent domain the citizen is guar-
anteed just compensation by both the United States and Pennsylvania Con-
stitutions.
Since the compensation which justifies eminent domain and taxation is
not paid to a holder from whom property is escheated or taken into custody,
and since such holders are subject to burdens of record keeping and reporting
at least as heavy as in taxation, some special justification must be shown for
escheats and takings. That justification can only be that the holder would re-
ceive a windfall or be unjustly enriched if the escheat or taking did not occur.
If such justification does not exist and if property is nevertheless escheated or
taken, the holder is subjected to a forfeiture in the form of cost-free eminent
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 333 (1953).
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domain or arbitrary taxation. He is punished as though a criminal, while
innocent in fact. Hence, the Commonwealth should meet the burden required
in a criminal rather than in a civil proceeding in order to succeed in an action
for escheat or taking of property merely held and unclaimed.- Windfall or
unjust enrichment must be shown, not merely by a "preponderance of the
evidence," but "beyond reasonable doubt." At the very least the holder should
have every defense against the Commonwealth which he might have had
against the original owner or obligee.
Against this background we may now review the present escheat laws
and consider their general pattern to see what changes would be desirable.
The general area will be subdivided into the following sections in an attempt
to simplify the matter: nature of Commonwealth's claims, types of property
and holders, procedure to enforce Commonwealth's claims, and missing
owners. In each instance there will be a summary of the present law and
recommendations for a new law.
PRESENT LAW AND SUGGESTIONS
Pennsylvania has more escheat laws than any other State of the Union.
In order to study these laws, an examination of at least the forty statutes listed
in the Appendices and Table of Effective Acts is necessary. For the sake of
brevity, they are cited hereafter by year alone, with additional decimals to
distinguish where there has been more than one in a given year. The per-
tinent laws are scattered throughout four titles of Purdon's Statutes, being
inconsistent, overlapping, and leaving many areas uncovered. Accordingly,
a revision of these statutes is necessary. Such a revision could appropriately
follow the framework of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act, 5 thereby providing comprehensive legislation in this area.
Nature of Commonwealth's Claims
Under the present law the Commonwealth may elect to take title to prop-
erty under the Intestate Act of 1947.1, as last permissible heir, " or in the case
of intestacy without heirs,'7 under the Acts of 1797 and 1889.1. The theoret-
ical difference between escheat and inheritance can create a serious difficulty
in practice. In a recent New York case this was pointed out when the Govern-
15 This statute has been enacted in the following states: Arizona, A.R.S. § 44-351; California,
Ch. 1809 Laws of 1959; New Mexico, Ch. 132 Laws of 1959; Oregon, Revised Statutes, § 98.302;
Utah, Code of 1953 § 78-44-1; Virginia Senate Bill, 119, 1960 enacted March 17, 1960; Washington
Revised Code, § 63.28.070. It has been proposed in the following state: Wisconsin, House Bill
1015, 1959, still pending.
16 Rhodes and Hannebaeur Estates, 71 Pa. D. & C. 330 (1950).
17 Moll's Estate, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 376 (1957).
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ment of Honduras sought to intervene in a New York probate proceeding to
claim assets located in New York belonging to a resident of Honduras, who
had died intestate without heirs. The New York court examined Honduran
law, finding that it provided for escheat as bona vacantia and not for ultimate
inheritance, and rejected the Honduran claim, saying:
We recognize that the law of the domicile generally prevails in this State
as to movables in a case relating to the transfer of estates by succession. Where
there is escheat no succession of estates is involved. The property, being left
without an owner, is property at large or bona vacantia. As such, it is deemed
property of the sovereign, where found. That sovereign recognizes no situs
but its own, and lays claim to such property. (Emphasis supplied.) 18
In addition to taking property by escheat or by inheritance, there are numer-
ous acts whereby the Commonwealth may gain custody and possession of prop-
erty. These acts are separately listed in Appendix "A."
A suggested way to eliminate the necessity of referring to the mass of
legislation and resolving inconsistencies would be to repeal the Act of 1889 in
favor of the Act of 1947. It is felt that the adoption of this suggestion, mak-
ing the Commonwealth an ultimate heir, would result in the accrual of many
advantages. For instance, property located within the boundaries of other
states could be claimed by the Commonwealth where the decedent was a
resident of or domiciled in Pennsylvania. Also so long as the Cold War con-
tinues, we should retain the provisions of the Act of 1953.1 to prevent Amer-
ican assets from ending up in Communist countries. Further, some position
should be taken as to found, apparently disowned and unheld property. Pri-
vate citizens who feel lucky will recommend "Finders Keepers" while dedi-
cated public officials will advocate for "Treasure Trove." Something should
be said, one way or the other.
As to the remaining types of property, the suggestion of the Governor,
to avoid use of the word, "escheat," should be followed. The Uniform Act
merely reads: "The following ownerless or unclaimed property shall be paid
into the State Treasury, subject to refund as provided." Such a change would
accomplish the purpose of giving the Commonwealth both custody and use
of the property, as well as title after the period for refund has expired.
Types of Property and Holders
Where private property is taken without quid pro quo, certain rules govern
the seizure. The Constitution prohibits deprivation of property without due
18 Turton's Estate, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 255, 193 N.Y.S. 2d 1001, motion for leave to appeal granted
196 N.Y.S. 2d 566 (1960).
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process of law, unfair taxation or cost-free condemnation, and impairment of
contracts. Equitable considerations of laches, de minimis, and the like, which
guarantee "repose of claims" and freedom from unreasonable effort and ex-
pense are also applicable. These imply that:
(1) The Commonwealth should be entitled to no greater substantive or
procedural rights than the former owner to whom it succeeds.
(2) Any holder should have against the State all defenses available
against the unknown or missing owner.
(3) The Commonwealth should not expose itself, or any holder, to ef-
fort or expense which would be out of proportion to the public benefit or pri-
vate harm caused.
No constitutional or equitable considerations suggest any change in the
present law, which makes the Commonwealth the next heir upon failure of
all reasonably remote relatives. Sound practical considerations, made clear
in the Garrett Estate, 9 show the fallacy of the previous Intestate Act,2" placing
the Commonwealth in line after all possible heirs. However, a problem is
presented where a missing heir returns to claim a refund. Here, as elsewhere,
the Commonwealth should be entitled to the same, but no greater, "repose of
claims" as the private holder would have enjoyed, if left in possession. Thus,
a missing heir should be given no more than a reasonable time after knowledge
and ability to present a claim for repayment from the State Treasury. 1
In addition to the subdivision of intestacy without heirs, it is suggested
that the laws be further consolidated and subdivided as found in Appendix
"B": trust funds and deposits, obligors (quasi-holders), and miscellaneous.
This subdivision of present acts would improve upon the pattern of the Uni-
form Act, which has separate sections for each of the following: property
held by banking or financial organizations, funds held by life insurance com-
panies, deposits and refunds held by utilities, property of business associations
and banking or financial associations, property held by fiduciaries, property held
by state courts, public officers and agencies, and miscellaneous personal property
held for another.
Also, in drafting a new law, it is important to keep in mind the follow-
ing three basic distinctions:
1st. For property found lying around loose in the public ways, a later ap-
pearing owner should have no more than a reasonable time after knowledge
and ability to claim a refund as in the case of intestacies.
19 321 Pa. 74, 183 At. 785 (1936); See also Garrett's Estate, 335 Pa. 287, 6 A.2d 858 (1939).20
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 137 (1917).
21 As upon attaining majority, recovery from insanity, or return from enforced absence, such
as internment or capture in war.
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2nd. Some real or tangible personal property is possessed by "true" holders,
who have received from a previous owner identifiable property with the un-
derstanding (usually in writing, by will, deed, court order, or the like) that
the property does not belong to the holder (although the understanding might
give him some rights), but is to be returned to the owner or used for a specific
purpose. Such a "true" holder, having no interest beyond any agreed com-
pensation or expense, can have no objections to the Commonwealth appearing
and asserting at any time the claim of the missing owner. In the case of such
a holder, the Commonwealth should be able to rely on the terms of the writ-
ten agreement or court order appointing him unless, within statutory limita-
tions, the holder has brought proceedings to be relieved of the agreement or
order. On the other hand, the Commonwealth must be bound by any rights
in the property given to the holder by the agreement or order. Absent such
a clear-cut written agreement or court order, there is no true holder.
3rd. Other "property" is possessed by pseudo-"holders," who have received
no specific property from an owner and have no understanding as to use or
disposition of the "property" possessed by them. These pseudo-"holders"
have merely become obliged to use their own funds to meet a monetary obli-
gation. Here the so-called "property" is an unestablished claim or chose in
action. In these cases the Commonwealth does not take either ownerless or
unclaimed property. The money compelled to be paid into the State Treasury
previously belonged to, and was claimed by, the "holder." Of course, if the
obligation to pay is valid and unquestioned, compulsory payment should be
enforced. If the obligation exists, its release by the mischance of the obligee's
disappearance would result in unjust enrichment. Hence, as in the case of
true holders, the question of proper treatment once more narrows to the field
of evidence and proof. If a quasi-holder has admitted in writing a liquidated
obligation or if it has been adjudicated, the Commonwealth should be entitled
to rely on the admission or adjudication without complaint by the obligor,
unless the obligor has taken timely proceedings for relief. On the other hand,
absent such acknowledgement or adjudication, the Commonwealth should be
required (as the missing owner would have been) to proceed with litigation
within the statutory limitations imposed upon the owner.
Because of these distinctions, catch-all wording as to holders is objection-
able and should be avoided in any revision. It should also be noted that
holders who qualify as religious, educational, charitable and fraternal organ-
izations should retain the exemption which they have thus far enjoyed from
escheats and custodial takings. Because of their public and philanthropic na-
ture, they are now freed from taxation, and should remain free from the ana-
logous burden here under discussion.
(VOL. 64
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There are also good grounds to object to the use of "catch-all" wording
as to property, such as "every other kind of personal property," etc.," even
though similar wording, "not otherwise covered" is used in the Uniform Act.
True holders and quasi-holders, who have operated in good faith for years on
the theory, that they had no liability as to certain types of "property" (espe-
cially alleged "obligations") are entitled to "repose" after the tolling of ap-
plicable statutes of limitations. Moreover, the very extensive enumeration of
specific types of property to be paid into the State Treasury, in previously used
terms (with clarification of obscurity where needed) should amply define the
"significant and welcome" additional revenue to which the Secretary of Reve-
nue has referred. However, if the present catch-all is to be continued, its un-
fairness should be minimized by proper provisions as to "Limitations" and
"Scope."
Procedure to Enforce Commonwealth Claims
No claim, public or private, can be enforced without proper knowledge
of it. Therefore, the Acts of 1919.2, sec. 1, 1929, sec. 1310 and 1937.2, secs. 8
and 9 as to custodial taking, require that the property first be "reported or
otherwise ascertained." The Act of 1929, sec. 1305 requires reports by per-
sons "receiving deposits of money; . . . acting in a fiduciary capacity; . . .
[acting as] prothonotary [or] ... clerk of court... receiving... property for
safekeeping . . . for storage; declaring dividends; . . . holding property for
another." In addition, sec. 1311 requires that the "last known addresses of
all persons to whom distributed shares ... are due ... in proceedings for the
dissolution of any corporation" be reported. Sections 1312, 1313 and 1314
require reports by liquidating trustees, court appointed receivers, and fidu-
ciaries on audit or adjudication of accounts.
Finally, the Act of 1937.2, sec. 3 requires that "companies" (as defined
therein) file reports of property previously discussed under this statute, and
the Act of 1949.2, sec. 4 requires like reports by life insurance companies as
to unclaimed proceeds of policies and annuities.
To simplify the above law, all these provisions should be consolidated
and every "holder" (true or pseudo) should be required to make an an-
nual verified report giving essential data as to property held and subject to
payment into the State Treasury. This is the pattern of the present Uniform
Act. There should also be provisions to insure the accuracy of reports for
the Commonwealth. A knowingly false report should be equivalent to per-
jury as the Acts of 1929, sec. 1720, 1937.2, sec. 11 and 1949.2, sec. 11 provide.
2 2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 111 (1953).
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However, the penalty should be made uniform, and a more reasonable rate
of interest (6 per cent) should be substituted for the purely penal rate of 12
per cent found in the Acts of 1915.2, 1929, 1937 and 1949.
Holders should not be required to report property which is neither "within
the Commonwealth nor subject to its control" as now provided in the Act of
1953.2, sec. 1. Also, they should not be required to report property of less
than a reasonable minimum value. Hence it would appear they should not be
required to report items as small as the dimes mentioned by the Secretary of
Revenue, nor property "whether or not of value," as is the opinion of the
present Attorney General.2" In view of the close analogy between these re-
ports and tax returns, it should be provided that in the absence of fraud, a
report shall not be questioned by the Commonwealth as to completeness or
accuracy in any action by it, unless brought within three years after filing.
This is the pattern of the United States Internal Revenue Code and should
be adopted in this area.24
Another method of ascertaining property to be paid into the State Treas-
ury is by inspections. The present law is found in the Act of 1915.2, sec. 13, 25
the Act of 1929, sec. 1305 and sec. 1303,26 and in the Act of 1937.2, sec. 4.27
Only the Act of 1915 provides that the expenses of inspections shall be paid
by the Commonwealth unless it is found that the report under consideration
was defective. In such a case, the costs are to be paid by the inspectee. All
three acts provide for compulsion to produce records: the Act of 1915 by
administrative subpoena and fine or imprisonment for misdemeanor, the Act
of 1929 by bill of discovery, and the Act of 1937 by petition for judicial sub-
poena and punishment for contempt.
The above acts could be consolidated with the following points borne
in mind. Inspections should be restricted to cases in which the Common-
wealth has good reason to believe that a filed report is inaccurate or incom-
plete, or that a required report has not been made. Also they should be re-
stricted to subject matter reportable, and must not deal with reports that have
become conclusive. Where an inspection proves to have been unnecessary,
the Commonwealth should not only pay its own expenses, but reimburse the
inspectee. Finally, judicial subpoena, alone, should be sufficient. The pun-
ishment for contempt and perjury if a report is willfully inaccurate should
be a sufficient sanction.
23 "Escheatable Property of No Value," 18 Pa. D. & C. 2d 543 (1959).
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501.
23 This section refers to unclaimed deposits.
26 These sections refer to "defeasibly held" property and income which is held in excess of the
limit provided by law.
27 This section refers to company-held property.
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Akin to inspection is the right to compel accounting by any holder subject
to court audit. This right is now provided by the Acts of 1889.1, secs. 7 and 8
and 1919.1, sec. 7. The former act deals with citations upon petition of an
escheator, and the latter upon petition by the Attorney General at the sug-
gestion of the Secretary of Revenue. These rights of the Commonwealth
should be retained, but exercised by the Attorney General, alone, rather than
by escheators.
A third method of ascertaining property to be reported and paid into
the Treasury is by the use of informers. The Act of 1855 and the Act of 1929,
sec. 1304, provide for compensation for any person "procur[ing] necessary
evidence to substantiate . . . escheats" and "prosecut[ing] the right of the
Commonwealth ... with effect." The compensation ranges from 25 per cent
of the first 50,000 dollars down to 2 per cent of the excess over 300,000 dol-
lars. The Act of 1915 excludes informers from compensation as to property
(deposits) covered therein. The 1953 amendment to the Act of 1929,
sec. 1304, excludes compensation with regard to unauthorized holding of real
estate by corporations, as well as providing for exclusion of persons required
to report. The Act of 1949.4, sec. 6, provides for no compensation in the case
of money in the hands of governmental officers. Furthermore, the Act of
1953.4 requires a bond to be posted by the informer to guarantee return of
his compensation, in case escheated property is reclaimed. While this sys-
tem of informers has existed for some time, it is alien to our general legal
principles, and should be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse. The pro-
vision for rewards, the lack of a requirement for precision in the informations
to be supplied and the absence of any responsibility on the informer col-
lectively provide an open invitation for informations to be filed out of sheer
malice or idle speculation on an "all to gain and nothing to lose" basis. The
alleged holder, wrongly accused and put to considerable unnecessary expense
of time and money, has no guarantee of reimbursement.
The following provisions would safeguard alleged holders, with no loss
and less expense to the Commonwealth:
(1) Informers must designate supposedly collectible property "with the
particularity of a complaint in assumpsit";
(2) Informers must post a bond to indemnify the alleged holder, if the
information is proved to be unfounded; and
(3) Payments to informers should be drastically reduced to no more than
5 per cent of any value collected as adequate compensation for service to the
State, rather than as a speculative "reward."
1960.]
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After the property is reported, the next step in this process often involves
litigation as to which there is an unbelievable mass of laws concerning who
shall sue, forms of action and procedure. A plaintiff in such an action may be
an informer, escheator, or the Attorney General. Although the Act of 1929, sec.
1304, mentions informers as "prosecut[ing] the right of the Commonwealth,"
there is no indication as to the manner of suit. With regard to escheators, the
Act of 1787 originally provided for an Escheator General to proceed by inquest
in cases of attaint. However, there are no reported cases of action under the
act. The modern law is embodied in the Act of 1929, sec. 1302, which provides
for commissioning by the Department of Revenue, followed by petition for
letters of administration in intestacies without heirs or for declaration of es-
cheat in other cases. There is also a provision for the posting of bond for
faithful performance.
The Attorney General may proceed under the Act of 1915.2, secs. 7 and
9, by bill in equity, petition, and bill for discovery in the case of depositaries.
He may also proceed under the Act of 1919.2, sec. I by petition, under the
Act of 1937.2, secs. 8 and 9 by bill in equity to escheat, or by bill to collect
without escheat. Furthermore, the Attorney General is empowered by the
Act of 1953.4 to appoint and fix the compensation of counsel for escheators.
Other parties not specified above may proceed under the Act of 1787,
sec. 8, to recover property of an intestate without heirs "by information of
debt, intrusion, or action of trover and conversion, or upon the case." Under
the Act of 1949.4, sec. 6, dealing with municipal unclaimed moneys, "pro-
ceedings . . . shall be governed by the laws relating to escheats now or here-
after in force."
Pursuant to the present provisions, a number of private parties may have
a speculative personal interest in the collection of State money. It is difficult
to justify these provisions in view of the current average amounts of collec-
tion indicated by the Secretary of Revenue to be in excess of 1,000,000 dollars
annually. There is no need for the State to employ outside help; the day
of the private tax gatherer is past. Certainly if the basis of compulsory pay-
ment into the State Treasury is to prevent windfalls and unjust enrichment
of holders, this same prevention should apply to other private individuals
who can now profit to the extent of 15 to 25 per cent of collections in amounts
less than 100,000 dollars each.
As an example of the operation of the present system, a recent press re-
lease indicates that "14 (in Philadelphia) Split $100,000 State Escheat Fees-
Payments Cover Their Services for Handling $792,666." It seems hard to
believe that such expenses need continue.
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In the past, while the laws of escheat were little known and seldom en-
forced, long and expensive litigation was necessary to clarify that law and to
establish a pattern of compliance. Those who engaged in these special efforts
earned unusual compensation. These conditions no longer exist. The time
has come to make enforcement of clarified and well publicized laws, relating
to unclaimed property, a matter of routine operation by regular government
officials. This is the pattern followed by the States adopting the Uniform
Act. In those states action is brought by the State Land Board, Treasurer,
Controller, or Attorney General.28 Washington has a provision, suitable for
Pennsylvania, under which the local county (district) attorneys assist when
they are needed.29 In no case is a provision made for extra or contingent
compensation, hence the additional expense of any newly required State em-
ployees can be paid out of collections.
Many acts have provisions covering matters of jurisdiction and venue.
Neither the Act of 1855, sec. 9, which provides simply for quo warranto, nor
the Act of 1787, sec. 8, which provides for the recovery of decedent's debts,
specifies the court in which to bring such actions. However, sec. 17 of the
latter act does provide for action in the supreme court on attaint.
General jurisdiction is specified by secs. 1 and 3 of the Act of 1888.1.
These sections confer jurisdiction upon the following courts for escheat ac-
tions: (1) the orphan's court of residence or location of the property in case
of intestacies; (2) the court in which the holder is to file his accounts; (3)
the court in which the property is deposited; (4) the court of the county in
which the property is located; (5) the court where the principal office of a
corporate holder is located; or (6) the common pleas court of the county in
which service may be made. The act also provides that the Common Pleas
Court of Dauphin County has concurrent jurisdiction for all common pleas
actions.
The Acts of 1915.2, sec. 7 and 1919.2, sec. 1 have similar provisions.
However, the Act of 1929, secs. 1308 to 1310 affords jurisdiction only for ac-
tions "provided by law ...in the proper court." The Act of 1935.3 has a
special provision for property deposited in any federal court, and specifies the
common pleas court of that county to take jurisdiction. In the case of a com-
pany holder, the Act of 1937.2, sec. 7 confers jurisdiction upon the common
pleas court in the county where the principal office is located. The Act of
1949.4, sec. 6 merely confers jurisdiction "as governed by law."
28 Arizona § 44.373 (Attorney General); California § 1523 (State Controller); New Mexico
§ 25 (State Treasurer); Oregon § 98.416 (State Land Board); Utah § 78-44-23 (State Treasurer);
Washington § 63.28.280 (Attorney General), § 11.08.190 (County Attorneys).
29 Washington § 11.08.190 (County Attorneys).
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These provisions for procedure and jurisdiction could be simplified and
consolidated into one general act. A single form of action, in the name of
the Commonwealth, which would be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure
applicable to actions in equity, depositions and discovery, would be desirable.
It should be brought by the Attorney General or his regular staff upon written
request of the Secretary of Revenue who should be required to specify the
property in question with full particularity and to give reasons (personal
knowledge or report from a holder) for the belief that it is payable into the
State Treasury. Jurisdiction and venue should be conferred upon the court
(Pennsylvania or Federal) where the fiduciary is accountable in the case of
money held by him. In other cases it should be the court where the property
is deposited or is held by one of its officers. Otherwise, the common pleas court
of the county where the holder may be served, or (there being no holder)
where the property is located, should be the court to take jurisdiction. There
is no good reason to saddle the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
with the burden of such litigation, especially if there is a provision that actions
may be brought by local district attorneys, on request of the Attorney Gen-
eral."o Intervention by the alleged owner in such actions should be provided
for as well as intervention by the Commonwealth in any private litigation
appearing to involve ownerless or unclaimed property.
Another important area in this section is the limitation of actions. In
the Act of 1889.1, sec. 26, there is a provision that: "[if] there have been no
proceedings had, as and for an escheat, for the period of twenty-one years
after the decease of said owner [intestate and without heirsi the Common-
wealth shall thereafter forever be debarred from claiming the same ... " "
However, it should be noted that this limitation has been held only to apply
to intestacies.
On the other hand, the bar of limitations and presumption of payments
have been eliminated only in the Acts of 1915.2, sec. 15 dealing with depos-
itaries, 1937.2, sec. 13 dealing with certain "companies" and with defined
"specialty debts" and 1949.2, sec. 13 dealing with life insurers- in each case
only as to types of property and holders described in these acts. The courts
have never extended this removal of limitations to types of property or holders
not covered by these acts. Thus, except for the situations covered by the Acts
of 1915, 1937 and 1949, the Commonwealth is presently bound by the six-year
30 See Commonwealth v. The Mutual Assurance Co., 16 Pa. D. & C. 2d 679 (1958), holding
that the Act of 1937.2, even though it gave jurisdiction to the common pleas in the county of the
holder's principal office, did not expressly oust the jurisdiction of Dauphin County under the Act
of 1870 P.L. 57.
3 1 Murdoch v. Penna. R.R., 19 Pa. D. & C. 2d 573, 73 Dauph. 65 (1958).
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statute of limitations." It is also bound by any presumptions of payment ex-
cept as provided under these three acts.3
In any revision of present law, the above distinction should be retained
between types of property upon which limitations run against the Common-
wealth and types upon which they do not. In situations where a true holder
of specific property or the obligor on a definite obligation ("having definite
maturity, interest rate, place and time of payment") 14 has admitted in writing
or has adjudicated the matter resulting in a matured and unconditional lia-
bility to deliver that property or to pay that obligation, the liability should be
enforced without deference to time. Otherwise, a windfall or unjust enrich-
ment would result, regardless of lapse of time, if that liability was to cease.
On the other hand, absent such written admission or adjudication where a
windfall or unjust enrichment is doubtful, the holder or obligor is entitled to
the same "repose" and release from standing ready to defend against the
Commonwealth as against the missing private claimant. The same principle
of "repose" applies in the field of retroactivity discussed in the next section.
Scope of Claims
Under this topic we refer to something different than the definition of
property or holders. Rather, we have in mind limits in space and time which
will confine the entire law. Under present law, there is in the 1953 Amend-
ment to sec. 3 of the Act of 1889.1, a repeated phrase "within or subject to
the control of the Commonwealth." However, this phrase is not defined any-
where in the act. Nevertheless, it is contained in earlier acts as found in
Appendix "C".
While it is felt that the general provision "within or subject to control of
the Commonwealth" should be retained, great care must be exercised with
respect to the italicized phrase. The Commonwealth might wish to leave
it vague from the standpoint of true and quasi-holders (obligors). However,
there are difficult problems of conflicts of laws and due process. These have
been discussed by the writer elsewhere."
The core of the difficulty lies in the fact that, while the law is clear as to
intestacies and as to tangible property which can be definitely located, there
is no established rule as to which state(s) may escheat, take into custody or
compel payment of different kinds of intangible personal property. The Su-
32 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1713).
3 3 Frey's Estate, 342 Pa. 351, 21 A.2d 23 (1941).
8 4
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 435 (1937).




preme Court of the United States has said in one breath that "the Full Faith
and Credit Clause bars ... double escheat." " In the next two breaths it has
upheld the residence of the obligee and the state of incorporation of the obli-
gor as sufficient "contacts" to justify escheat3s Dissenting justices have sug-
gested at least six other contacts which might be equally sufficient." State court
decisions are inconclusive on this point. Thus, holders can and some prob-
ably will find themselves in the middle of a glorious interstate Donnybrook
of multiple claims to the same property.
No satisfactory solution of this problem has yet been devised but the
Uniform Act contains two partially helpful provisions. One exempts prop-
erty previously escheated to other states,"5 while the other provides reciprocal,
bilateral recognition of rights of other states.4" However, this is of little use
when more than one state other than Pennsylvania is involved. As an ex-
ample, consider the case of an intangible obligation "held" in Pennsylvania
by a corporation organized in Ohio, and owing to a last known resident of
New Jersey.
The current Pennsylvania law, the Act of 1929, sec. 504, is inadequate
as to claims because it only applies to corporations and associations, not to all
holders. It operates only after payment has been made to Pennsylvania, and
affords no remedy for conflicting claims of other states. Moreover, it provides
only for refunds for which cash may not be available, or for assignable credits
against debts to the State and for interest at the rate of only 2 per cent. It is
available only if property paid into the State Treasury is found "subject to es-
cheat in any other State . . . and not legally subject to escheat by the Common-
wealth ... or to payment into the State Treasury without escheat." While it has
36 Standard Oil Co. v. State of New Jersey, 346 U.S. 428, 443, 71 Sup. Ct. 822, 831 (1951).
37 In Standard Oil Co. v. State of New Jersey, 346 U.S. 428, 71 Sup. Ct. 822 (1951), New
Jersey was the domicile and its right was upheld; whereas, in the case of Conn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 682 (1948), the Supreme Court upheld the right of
New York as the state of last known residence of the owner.
38 In Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore 333 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 682 (1948), Justice
Jackson suggested the contacts of the following states where (a) the owner died, (b) the beneficiary
was last known to be resident; (c) there was a later and longer residence; (d) the insured and
beneficiary moved after the obligation was contracted in New York; (e) there was permanent
domicile, in contrast to residence; and (f) the policy was delivered.
as "This Act shall not apply to any property which has been presumed abandoned or escheated
under the laws of another state prior to the effective date of this Act." See Arizona § 44.376.
40 "Reciprocity for property presumed abandoned or escheated under the laws of another state
-If specific property which is subject to the provisions of this Act is held for or owed or distributa-
ble to an owner whose last known address is in another state by a holder who is subject to the
jurisdiction of that state, the specific property is not presumed abandoned in this state and subject
to this chapter if: (a) It may be claimed as abandoned or escheated under the laws of such other
state; and (b) The laws of such other state make reciprocal provision that similar specific property
is not presumed abandoned or escheatable by such other state when held for or owed or distributable
to an owner whose last known address is within this state by a holder who is subject to the
jurisdiction of this state." See Arizona § 44.360.
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been held that only one state may escheat, the justices of the Supreme Court
who dissented in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore " have sug-
gested that several may assert claims without escheat. In such a situation, the
Act of 1929 provides no relief.
A more equitable provision, which should be included in the proposed
revision, is to allow a holder-obligor, subjected to multiple claims, the same
remedy as is available against conflicting private claimants. The revision
should include legislative authority for consent by the Commonwealth to in-
terpleader.4" This provision would, of course, become obsolete if the Supreme
Court of the United States, or Congress under its powers over interstate com-
merce, were to define the respective rights of the several States, but it is es-
sential to afford due process to holders in the interim.
Except as to the statutes of limitations and presumption of payment, dis-
cussed above, the present law is silent as to time limits. However, because of
two decisions'next analyzed and the previously mentioned "catch-all" phrases
covering "all other kinds of property and interests" (which may be expected
to appear in any revision) the new law should contain a provision against
retroactive effect. In the case of In re Pennsylvania Railroad;" the Common-
wealth sought to recover half a million dollars of wages allegedly earned,
admittedly unclaimed, but for which no funds had been earmarked. The
Dauphin. County Court in 1943 correctly held that under then effective law
these claims did not escheat, and the Commonwealth did not appeal. Ten
years later, in 1953, the Act of 1889 was amended to include "debts, claims
and choses in action." In a new suit of Murdoch v. Pennsylvania Railroad "
the same court held, on preliminary objections, that these same wages did
escheat. In its opinion, the court said that this "property... (more accurately
'these obligations') was never escheatable under the Act of 1889 and 'only
purported to become so' upon enactment of the Act of 1953." " This was
more than a decade after the holder had won its suit as to this very property!
Nevertheless, the court also observed (but did not decide, since it was merely
disposing of preliminary objections) that these objections must be dismissed
both as to claims upon which the statute of limitations had run, and those
which became escheatable "more than 21 years prior ... to filing the peti-
tion." 46 This later case was settled prior to trial on the merits, and before
any final opinion by the Dauphin County Court.
41 333 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 682 (1948).
42 Most logically under the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 1335.
43 48 Pa. D. & C. 611, 54 Dauph. 91 (1943).
44 19 Pa. D. & C. 2d 573, 73 Dauph. 65 (1958).
45Id. at 613, 73 Dauph. at 93.
46 Id. at 595, 73 Dauph. at 80.
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Therefore, the law remains unsettled and the facts unascertained. It
may be that unconditional written admissions of the railroad-"holder" or even
earlier adjudications in wage suits had made its obligations indisputable. Con-
sequently, excusing the holder from payment (regardless of lapse of time)
would have resulted in a windfall or unjust enrichment. On the other hand,
if such admissions or adjudications did not exist, later collection by the Com-
monwealth after an earlier adverse decision would certainly be a strange form
of due process.
As already pointed out, a proper revision of the law would relieve alleged
obligees on supposed claims from standing ready to defend such claims, when
an appropriate statute of limitations has run against the private "owner-obli-
gee." It is even more essential to fair play that a statute or a decision, declaring
escheatable or collectible "property" (alleged obligations) not previously sub-
ject to escheat or collection, be applied only to obligations upon which the
statute of limitations has yet to run after the passage of that act or the rendition
of that decision. The present and proposed specific types of property to be paid
into the treasury so adequately encompass the great majority of such types
that any later proposed types of property can well be collected only prospect-
ively, not retroactively.
Missing Owners
Enoch Arden was not an isolated case. Many an owner, after absence
and silence for years, later turns up and alleges his title. How are his rights
now protected?
Under the present law, there are certain provisions for notice which must
be complied with before the Commonwealth can take the property by escheat.
These provisions vary in respect to the types of property in question. In the
case of real estate notice is effected by serving process upon the person in pos-
session.47  However, in the case of deposits, 4 life insurance,49 dividends 50 and
unclaimed monies," notice is effected by merely advertising and mailing to
the missing owner's last known address. Whether or not this latter procedure
must be complied with depends upon the value of the property which varies
from section to section. The requirement of notice is not a condition pre-
cedent to bringing the suit in the above cases of personal property as it is in
real estate.
47 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 43 (1889).
48 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 262 (1915) applies where the amount is more than ten dollars.
49 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 435 (1937) applies where the amount is more than ten dollars.
50 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 496 (1949) applies where the amount is more than fifty dollars.
51 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 494 (1949) has no specified minimum.
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In drafting a new law the rule as to minimum amounts should be made
uniform, and the minimum amount should be at such a level that neither the
holders nor the Commonwealth would be put to unreasonable expense. Fur-
thermore, notice in any form before suit should not be necessary, as long as
the court is required (in the light of facts pleaded or proven) to specify and
order adequate notice after the suit is started.
As a second protection to missing owners, intervention is permitted after
notice and before conclusion of the suit. The Act of 1889.1, sec. 7, allows
intervention pending proceedings for escheat, and sec. 22 permits it within
three years after final adjudication. Intervention is permitted under the Act
of 1915.2, sec. 7, "if [the] right shall not be barred by the statute of limita-
tions or presumptions of payment." Similar provisions are also embodied in
the Act of 1937.2, secs. 8 and 9, again subject to the statute of limitations and
presumptions of payment.
These statutes should be consolidated in accordance with their present
substance, but in a more brief form. In addition, the provisions barring owners
by the statute of limitations and presumptions of payment should apply equal-
ly to the Commonwealth.
As a third protection to missing owners, in the case of unclaimed de-
posits, the Act of 1915.2, sec. 8, allows the true owner or his legal representa-
tive, within ten years after payment into the State Treasury, to make a claim
for refund "out of moneys appropriated for the purpose." He may also sue
the Commonwealth, "failing such appropriation and payment." For unclaimed
funds held by fiduciaries, the Act of 1919.1, sec. 4, allows the owner to apply
at any time and to receive refund with interest at 2 per cent. This same pat-
tern is followed in respect to money paid into the State Treasury under the
Act of 1929, sec. 504, as well as a provision for an assignable credit against
the Commonwealth if payment is not made. The Act of 1937.2, sec. 10, as
amended in 1939, follows the provisions of the Act of 1919.1, for here refund
is 'also permitted where property is found escheatable to another jurisdiction,
but is not escheatable or collectible by Pennsylvania. In this case only, the
statute provides for an assignable credit against the Commonwealth. Where
the assets are the proceeds of life insurance, the Act of 1949.2, sec. 8 applies
following the pattern of the Acts of 1919 and 1937.
These provisions need drastic revision since, in various aspects, they are
unfair both to the owner and to the Commonwealth. So far as the owner is
concerned, there is no reason why he should receive interest at only 2 per cent
from the Commonwealth if his arrangement with the previous holder had
1960.1
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provided for a higher rate. The Commonwealth should have the same bene-
fits as the holder in the case of statutes of limitation and presumptions of pay-
ment against the owner. Present provisions for refund at any time open the
door wide to fraudulent or dilatory claimants. A claimant, having prima facie
evidence of a claim, might do nothing until the statute of limitations had run,
or until the "holder" (lulled into a false sense of security) had destroyed its
proof and all opposing witnesses were forgetful or absent. Then a friend of
the 'claimant would file an information in escheat, and the Commonwealth
would bring a proceeding to collect. By hypothesis, the holder would be un-
able to present its evidence in defense. This is especially true where the de-
fense of limitations is not to be available to the holder if the Commonwealth
itself is dilatory. At this point the claimant would have two alternatives. He
might intervene and present his claim, wait until the Commonwealth had col-
lected the proceeds and turned them over to the Secretary of Revenue, or wait
still longer to claim a refund. In either case the public facilities of the State
would have been misused for private gain.
There remain two areas for discussion which will be briefly considered
for the sake of completeness, since they are largely non-controversial. Where
the State Treasurer converts property into cash, the Acts of 1889.1, secs.
16 to 20 and 1919.1, sec. 6(a) apply in the case of real estate, while the
Act of 1929, sec. 1310.1 applies in the case of personal property. The acts
relating to real estate have the defect of mentioning escheators, which should
no longer be used if collections are to be made by the regular staff of the At-
torney General. The Act of 1929 provides for sales "under terms and con-
ditions fixed by the Dauphin County Court." This is sufficiently brief and
simple, but if Dauphin County is to be relieved of its burden, there could be
substituted for it "the court with jurisdiction to order payment into the Treas-
ury.
Secondly, in regard to the use of funds in the treasury, the Act of 1935.2
provides for collections "to be credited to the General Fund." Subject to
temporary retention of amounts sufficient to meet expected refunds, this pro-
vision should continue.
CONCLUSION
Revision and consolidation of Pennsylvania's escheat laws are long over-
due, and efficient compliance cannot be expected in the midst of present con-
fusion. A good general framework for a new law is the Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act, modified to incorporate the following basic principles: (a) no
overreaching by the Commonwealth, (b) protection against conflicting claims
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of other States, (c) avoidance of retroactivity, and (d) preservation of de-
fenses available against missing owners minimizing effort and expense of com-
pliance and enforcement. Further, the claims to be asserted by the Common-
wealth should initially be for custody only, subject to refund upon timely claim
by the true owner, except that in the case of intestacies without defined heirs,
the property should at once descend to the Commonwealth. A special rule
should be prescribed for found property.
Due to the complexities of present law, specific definitions of unclaimed
property and holders should be simplified and consolidated. "Catch-alls"
should be avoided, and present exemptions of religious, educational, fraternal
and charitable holders should be continued. Rights of missing owners should
be safeguarded by adequate provisions for notice, intervention and refund.
To facilitate administration of the escheat laws, enforcement procedures
should be greatly simplified-provisions should be made for limitations on
reports and inspections, while informers, if not abolished, should be narrowly
circumscribed in function and pay. There should be one simple form of action
for custodial taking, to be brought locally, thus, relieving the present needless
burden on Dauphin County. The needless expense of escheators and special
counsel should be eliminated, by provisions for these actions to be brought
by the Attorney General's regular staff with the help of local district attorneys.
The scope of the new law should be properly circumscribed to preserve
for both the Commonwealth and holders of unclaimed property all defenses
available against missing owners, including statutes of limitations and pre-
sumptions of payment as to doubtful claims. Custodial takings should be re-
stricted to property within the Commonwealth or subject to its control. Pro-
vision should be made for the protection of interpleader against conflicting
claims of other States. Above all, to preserve the status quo, retroactive ap-
plication of new definitions of unclaimed property should be eliminated. It
is felt that in this manner the escheat program could become fair, effective,
and lucrative.
APPENDIX "A"
In addition to the Acts of 1889, 1929 and 1947, there are the following Acts pro-
viding for the Commonwealth to take title or custody:
1833, sec. 1, title, to lands purchased by unlicensed corporations
1855, sec. 9, title to property held in mortmain beyond permitted limits
1869, sec. 3, title, to property in hands of any trustee, bailee or other depositary .
"as a fiduciary agent"
-1887, sec. 1, title, to "lands and property" of corporations unauthorized to hold
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1889.1, title, in intestacies, as mentioned above, and
Sec. 2, to property in hands of a Pennsylvania trustee accounting in a Pennsyl-
vania court
Sec. 3, to property in hands of a trustee accounting to a Pennsylvania court,
where c.q.t. is unknown
1911, amending sec. 3 of the Act of 1889 to cover dry or terminated trusts
1915.2:
Sec. 7, title, to certain "deposits, dividends, profits, debt or interest" in hands
of certain depositaries
Sec. 9, title, to "property received for storage or safekeeping"
1917, sec. 4, title, to property under a dry or terminated trust, deposited in court, or
held for others
1919.2, sec. 1, custody, of any property then or thereafter escheatable, after report or
other ascertainment
1921.1, sec. 5, title to property deposited in any court, State or Federal, in the Common-
wealth
1929:
Sec. 1310, custody, in terms nearly verbatim the Act of 1919
Sec. 1311, custody, of distributive shares of corporations in dissolution
Sec. 1313, custody, of funds in possession of court appointed receivers
Sec. 1314, custody, of funds in hands of court appointed fiduciaries
1935.3, title, to property in hands of a trustee accounting to a U.S. court sitting in
Pennsylvania
1937.1, title, to money in hands of present and former court officers
1937.2, secs. 8 and 9, title or custody, of certain types of property required to be reported
1949.2, custody, of monies payable under life insurance and annuity contracts
1949.4, title, to money held or appropriated for payment of checks issued by munici-
palities and money paid to municipal officers
1953.2, sec. 1, title, to all ownerless or unclaimed "real or personal property within or
subject to the control of this Commonwealth"; and after enumerating
particular types, defines real and personal property to include "every other
form of personal property, tangible or intangible, and all interests therein,
whether legal or equitable"
1953.1, custody, of property in the hands of a fiduciary subject to court accounting,
where the beneficiary is a non-resident of the United States and would not
have the "actual benefit, use, enjoyment or control thereof"
APPENDIX "B"
The Acts referring to other types of ownerless or unclaimed property are:
Trust Funds and Deposits
1869, in the hands of "fiduciary agents"
1889.1, secs. 2 and 3, of trustees
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1911, sec. 1, trustees
1915.2, sec. 7, depositaries
1917, sec. 4, depositaries
1919.1, sec. 1, receivers and trustees
1921.1, sec. 5, deposits in court
1929, sec. 1305, fiduciaries and receivers
1935.3, deposits in Federal courts
1937.1, sec. 1, county officers
1937.2, sec. 3, advances, tolls and deposits of utilities
1949.4, sec. 5, funds of municipal officers
1953.1, fiduciaries accounting in court
Obligors (Quasi-Holders)
1937.2, secs. 2 and 3, dividends, profits, non-life insurance proceeds, stock and debts
"having definite maturities, interest rates, places and times of payment,
such as mortgages, bonds, rates, equipment-trust certificates and deben-
tures"
1949.2, sec. 3, life insurance and annuity proceeds
1949.4, sec. 4, money to pay uncashed municipal checks
Miscellaneous:
1833 and 1887, property held by unauthorized corporations
1855, property in mortmain
1953.2, "all other personal property, tangible or intangible"
APPENDIX "C"
The other acts referring to scope of claims are:
1787, sec. 8, as to intestacies, property "in the hands or possession of any person
dwelling in this state"
1787, sec. 17, as to attaint, none expressed
1833, sec. 1, "lands within this Commonwealth"
1844, sec. 1, "lands ...within this Commonwealth"
1855, sec. 9, as to mortmain, none stated
1869, sec. 3, none stated
1887, sec. 1, "corporation of this state"
1889.1, sec. 1, "real or personal estate within the Commonwealth"
sec. 2, "in the custody or . .. under the control of any court of this Common-
wealth"
sec. 3, "on account ... in any court of this Commonwealth"
1911, sec. 1, none stated
1915.2, sec. 9, none stated
1915.2, sec. 11, "doing business in the Commonwealth"
1919.1, sec. 1, "subject to the jurisdiction of any court .. . in this Commonwealth"
1921.1, sec. 5, "in any federal court in or for any district within the Commonwealth"
1960.]
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1929, secs. 1305, 1311 and 1314 "doing business in this Commonwealth"; "in a fiduciary
capacity"; "deposited in the court (of this Commonwealth)"; "engaged
in the business of receiving moneys on deposit . .. in this Common-
wealth"; "dissolution in any court of common pleas in this Common-
wealth"; "appointed by any court in this Commonwealth"
1935.2, sec. 1, "under control of . ..any court of the United States in and for any
district within this Commonwealth"
1937.1, sec. 1, "(officers of) counties of the first class
1937.2, sec. 2, "(holders) incorporated and doing business in this Commonwealth"
1943, sec. 1, "United States Courts or its officers in any district in this Commonwealth"
1949.2, sec. 2, "(life insurers) doing business in this Commonwealth; . .. (claimant)
last known address in this Commonwealth"
1949.4, sec. 2, "municipal officers . . . in a municipality (of this Commonwealth)"
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